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Non-technical Summary
Due to increasing globalization of markets, it is often hypothesized that firms in the 1990s
engaged in merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in order to secure their international
competitiveness by strengthening their core competencies. Distinguishing between mar-
ket related and technological firm competencies, this paper investigates whether there is
evidence for a bundling of competencies through M&A among German domestic mergers
in the 1990s.
Based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which is a representative survey for
German manufacturing and the service sector, firms that engaged in M&A during the
1990s have been identified. Those have been traced on the internet in order to find their
respective merging partner. For the firm pairs found in this manner, firm information
in the year prior to the merger is taken from the database of Creditreform, the largest
German credit rating agency. Moreover, patent data from the German Patent and Trade
Mark Office (GPTO) has been added to complete the data set.
In order to answer the question on the importance of core competencies as a driver of
M&A activities, a conditional logit model is applied. The econometric specification maps
the firm decision with whom to merge, which is almost not analyzed in the empirical eco-
nomic literature. Market relatedness of a merger is defined as a merger deal within one
industry. To measure technological proximity an angular separation measure is calculated
on basis of the merging partners’ patent portfolios. Further, it controlled for firm size,
geographical proximity, and firms’ financial situation.
The results approve that M&As in the 1990s are used as a means to concentrate on firms’
core competencies. Market-relatedness as well as technological proximity of the merging
partners are important determinants of the decision with whom to merge. A discrete
change from zero to one in affiliation to the same industry increases the probability of a
merger or acquisition by 45%, ceteris paribus. If the overlap of firms patent portfolios
increases by 100% at the mean, which corresponds to a 20% overlap, the probability of a
merger increases by 6.3%-points.
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Abstract
In the context of increasing globalization of markets, merger and acquisition ac-
tivities in the 1990s are said to be driven by reorganization processes with respect
to concentration on firms’ core competencies in order to increase or maintain mar-
ket power in international markets. This paper empirically investigates a sample
of German domestic mergers in the 1990s to detect the impact of technology and
market relatedness on the choice of the merging partner. Results from a conditional
logit model show that firms prefer a merging partner within the same industry and
with a related technological profile. These findings approve the hypothesis that
mergers in the 1990s were undertaken to concentrate on core competencies.
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1 Introduction
Due to increasing globalization of markets, it is often hypothesized that firms engage in
merger and acquisition (M&A) activities in order to secure their international competi-
tiveness. While the former merger waves in the 1960s and 1980s were characterized by
diversification endeavors, M&A activities in the 1990s are said to be driven by firm strate-
gies that aimed at strengthening competitiveness and market power within their field of
core competencies. M&As provide firms the possibility to grow, lower sector or techno-
logical competition, and to benefit from economies of scale and scope, which has been
important for increasing or maintaining market power in opened, international markets.
Besides output market advantages associated with a merger, technological competencies
are supposed to have played a major role during the fifth merger wave. Due to a shift
from price competition towards competition based on technical inventions the importance
of technological assets and competencies has risen over the past decades. Thus, techno-
logical proximity as well as output market relatedness enter the econometric model as the
key variables. The estimated model maps the firm decision with whom to merge.
Empirically, this question is almost unexamined. Most theoretical and empirical studies
on M&A investigate the effects of a merger on profits, overall firm performance or on
shareholder value (see Roeller et al., 2001, for a review). Only a few of those studies focus
on the technological firm performance (e.g. Cassiman et al., 2004). A second strand of
the literature analyzes the determinants for entering the M&A market, either as a target
or as an acquiring firm (e.g. Mueller, 1980); among those, some studies explicitly take
R&D into account (e.g. Hall, 1999). But the question in between, namely the firm’s
decision with whom to merge, is largely unexplored. To my knowledge, Hall (1988) is the
only study that analyzes the firm’s choice of the merging partner, based on a large sample
of publicly traded US firms in the period from 1976 to 1986. She explicitly takes R&D
into account. In the context of a market value model, Hall (1988) concludes that R&D
activities of target firms are of high value to acquiring firms.
Going beyond the question whether R&D in general is important for the merger deci-
sion, this paper investigates whether firm-specific technology portfolios drive the decision
with whom to merge. The focus is on domestic mergers in Germany during the fifth
merger wave in the 1990s. Controlling for firm size, geographical proximity, and firms’
credit worthiness it turns out that firms tend to choose merging partners with a related
technological profile as well as such within the same industry. This finding approves the
hypothesis that mergers in the 1990s are undertaken to concentrate on core competencies.
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The underlying data set is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which is a
yearly survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on behalf
of the Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF). Started in 1992, the MIP is
a representative firm survey of German manufacturing and the service sector and has the
advantage of containing a large number of small and privately held companies. For each
of the years 1997, 1999, and 2001, the survey contains a question on merger activities
over the previous three years. For the period from 1993 to 1995, the survey contains
a question on structural changes in the firms followed by a text field, where firms are
asked to describe the respective change. Firms who responded that they had undertaken
a merger, were searched on the internet in 2004. Merging partners were identified on the
basis of information given on firms’ websites and public business pages.
Out of 2,356 firms in German manufacturing and 1,643 firms in the German service sector
that declared that they had engaged in M&A in the period from 1993 to 2001, 424 merg-
ing pairs were found on the web. One possible source of loosing observations is firm exit.
Moreover, firms may have changed their names after the merger and are, therefore, not
traceable on the web. Since the MIP contains many small and medium-sized companies
some firms are simply not present on the internet. A large share of the mergers found -
250 deals out of 424 - were cross-boarder. These cases had to be excluded as there was no
information on foreign firms available to me. The internet search highlighted, moreover,
the fact that many firms who declared that they had merged actually did something else.
For example, one of two branches of the same company exited and the other took over
responsibilities. Furthermore, in the case of some firms no information on the year prior
to the merger was available.2
The final sample consists of 101 domestic M&A pairs. Information on the partner and
the acquiring firms in the year prior to the merger are taken from the database of Cred-
itreform, a German credit rating agency, that contains the whole population of firms in
Germany. Creditreform also provides a credit rating index, which is used to proxy the
financial situation of the sample firms. Patent information is taken from the database of
the German Patent and Trade Mark Office (GPTO).
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics distinguishing between acquiring and target firms
in case of acquisitions and firms involved in a merger. It emerges that acquiring firms
face the best overall firm performance followed by target firms, whereas merging firms
2Notice that the pattern of M&As per year does not show a selection bias towards early sample years
(see Appendix).
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perform less well. This shows that the best performers acquire promising candidates,
whereas firms that do less well combine their assets and competencies to jointly maintain
competitiveness.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Characteristics of the firms
acquiring firms target firms mergers
# obs. 71 71 60
unit mean std.dev. mean std.dev. mean std.dev.
employees persons 32,722 100,110.70 8,467 29,338.25 3,033 6,758.40
> 250 employees [0/1] .55 .50 .55 .50 .42 .35
credit rating [100;600] 170.18 75.09 173.03 85.80 175.58 82.48
age years 31.11 40.79 27.82 34.49 36.57 40.02
patent activity [0/1] .23 .42 .10 .36 .13 .26
East Germany [0/1] .17 .38 .15 .36 .33 .44
Characteristics of the merger
# pairs 101
mean t-stata std.dev
∆ log(employees) persons 6.73*** 24.11 2.80
∆ credit rating [0;500] 78.94*** 9.93 79.89
∆ age years 32.40*** 8.71 37.36
geogr. proximity km 185.40*** 9.50 19.52
techn. proximity [0;1] .10*** 3.43 .28
same industry [0/1] .43*** 8.61 .50
*** indicate a significance level of 1%.
a t-statistics on a two-tailed test of mean differences.
In detail, acquiring firms are the largest firms in terms of average employment. Firms
involved in a merger have the smallest labor force, on average. This also holds when
the share of large firms with more than 250 employees is focused on. Acquiring firms,
moreover, have the best credit rating, on average. Credit ratings are used by potential
lenders, such as banks and suppliers, to predict the default probability of the firm in
question. Accordingly, the credit rating proxies the firm’s financial status.3 The credit
rating ranges from 100 to 600, where 100 corresponds to the best rating. In general, the
mean of the credit rating does not vary much across the three firm groups and lies in the
upper range of possible values, which shows that weak performers are not present in this
M&A sample. Focusing on innovation activities, it turns out that the share of innovative
firms, measured by a dummy that equals one if a firm has filed at least one patent in the
past, is highest among the acquiring firms.
Eastern German firms turn out to be less involved in M&A activities than Western Ger-
man firms. Up to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Eastern Germany has been a planned
economy and since then has been undergoing a transition process into a market economy.
Nowadays, Eastern German firms still lag behind their Western German counterparts in
3Detailed information on the credit rating index can be found in Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004).
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many respects, e.g. in productivity (Czarnitzki, 2005). Thus, they are supposed to lack
the financial means to acquire another firm and, moreover, present rather unattractive
acquisition targets.
With respect to firm age, there are no large mean differences among the firm groups.
Firms involved in M&A activities have been founded about 31 years ago, on average.
In addition, Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the characteristics of the mergers. The
absolute mean differences ∆ in size4, credit rating and age of the merger pairs differ in
statistical significance from zero as a t-test shows. This might suggest that large firms
with a good market performance merge with smaller and, particularly, with younger firms,
whose credit rating is good, though worse than their own.
To answer the question whether concentration on technological core competencies has
driven the choice of the merging partner, a measure of technological proximity is obtained
from the angular separation (or uncentered correlation) measure, which was introduced
to the patent literature by Jaffe (1986). Technological proximity T between two firms i
and j is defined on the basis of their technology vectors Fi and Fj:
Tij =
FiFj√
(F ′iFj)(F ′iFj)
, 0 ≤ Tij ≤ 1, (1)
with Fi = (PSiA, PSiB, ..., PSiH) and Fj = (PSjA, PSjB, ..., PSjH), where PS equals the
firm’s patent application stocks per IPC (International Patent Classification) class, A-H,
as a percentage of the firm’s total patent application stock in the same year. The patent
stock PS for each IPC class is calculated as:
PSit = PSi,t−1(1− δ) + patent applicationsit, (2)
where the constant depreciation rate of knowledge δ is set to .15 as common in the liter-
ature (see e.g. Hall, 1990). By definition, this measure can take values between 0 and 1,
where 1 corresponds to an identical technology portfolio of firms i and j.
Furthermore, it is controlled for output market relatedness of the merger pairs as opposed
to technological proximity. A distinction between merging firms in the same industry sec-
tor and others provides a rough measure for the hypothesis that M&A activities are driven
by concentration on core competencies on the output side. A merger in the same industry
can lead to economies of scale in output and/or distribution (Cassiman et al., 2004). As
output market relatedness is measured on a two-digit NACE level, mergers in the same
field may also generate economies of scope by product diversification within an industry
branch. Table 1 shows that almost half of the mergers have occurred in the same industry.
4As the distribution of the ∆ size shows a considerable skewness, the difference in logs is used.
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Moreover, geographical proximity of the merging firm pairs is calculated on the basis of
the degree of longitude and degree of latitude determined by firms’ zip codes. From this
information, the distance between firms is calculated using the well-known theorem of
Pythagoras. The distance between the merging partners averages out at 185 km.
3 Econometric Model and Empirical Results
The model follows Hall (1988) and was developed originally in the context of a market
value model. It is assumed that the value V of a firm is a function of firm characteristicsX.
In the presence of efficient markets and full information, V (Xi) equals the price at which i’s
asset bundle is traded. However, acquisitions take place at a significant positive premium
over pre-announcement stock and some agents place a higher value on Xi than the market.
Therefore, acquisition decisions are assumed to be driven by disequilibria. Moreover, it
is assumed that each year, the optimal configuration of corporate characteristics changes
due to external shocks to the economic environment. Acquiring firms j can acquire any
other firm i. If acquisition occurs, the increment to the value of firm j is Vj(Xi). Thus,
j acquires i, if j’s gain from acquiring firm i is positive and larger than the gain from a
merger with any other target k:
Vj(Xi)− Pi > 0 and Vj(Xi)− Pi > Vj(Xk)− Pk, ∀ k ∈ C, (3)
where Pi is the price of i’s assets and C is the entire pool of firms. Prices are endoge-
nous, assuming that firm j acts as a bidder. A new bid above the current trading price
occurs because j has revealed new information about the value of i’s assets. The price
at which firms evaluate the purchase is assumed to be an unobservable function of the
firm characteristics V (Xi). Separating j’s profit from the acquisition into observable and
unobservable components yields:
Vj(Xi)− Pi = f(Xi, Xj) + εij, (4)
where εij is independent and follows an extreme value distribution by assumption. This
leads to a conditional logit probability that an acquisition takes place:5
P (j buys i|C) = e
f(Xj ,Xi)∑
kC e
f(Xj ,Xk)
. (5)
Specifying the value function f(·) as the difference between the valuation of the acquiring
firm vj and the equilibrium price v yields:
5If the assumption of constant effects of the regressors on the choice probability is relaxed, a multino-
mial model could be assumed, alternatively.
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P (j buys i|C) = e
vj(Xi)−v(Xi)∑
kC e
vj(Xk)−v(Xk) , (6)
where small letters correspond to the measurable components of V and Vj.
The econometric specification of the value function as a function of the firm characteristics
is specified as follows:6
vj(Xi)− v(Xi) = Xjβ1 +Xiβ2 + |Xj −Xi|β3 (7)
The characteristics X include firm size, age, a credit rating index, firm location, techno-
logical and geographical proximity. Moreover, intra-industry deals are controlled for.
To analyze the decision with whom to merge, a conditional logit model is applied. Since
the choice set C is huge as it includes every firm in Germany, an alternative choice set
of ten possible target firms that have not been acquired in the same year is drawn for
each acquirer7 as proposed by McFadden (1978). Alternative targets are drawn from the
MIP. Eventually, the database contains the actual target as well as ten alternative targets
for each acquiring firm. In order to prove independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA),
which is a necessary condition for the application of a conditional logit model, the regres-
sion is repeated for a sample with only five alternative targets included. Under the IIA
assumption, no systematic change in the coefficients of the regression model is expected if
alternatives are excluded. The test-statistic is χ2-distributed with 10 degrees of freedom
and takes the value 12.35. The p-value for this Hausman-statistic is .26 and is, therefore,
not different from zero at any conventional level of statistical significance. In other words,
the IIA assumption is valid for the respective model.
For interpretational reasons Table 2 shows the marginal effects evaluated at the sample
means instead of the regression coefficients. The first column (I) contains the results for
the larger sample with ten alternative targets, the second column (II) shows the results
for the sample, where five alternatives are excluded. The little difference between the
estimated models (I) and (II) illustrates the validity of the IIA. The interpretation of the
marginal effects is based on the estimation results (I).
It turns out that M&As associated with large size differences are more likely to occur.
Concrete, a 100% increase in size difference between firms at the sample mean increases the
probability of a merger or acquisition by 6%-points. This result contradicts Hall’s (1988)
finding for publicly traded US firms that mergers associated with large size differences
are less likely to occur. As the underlying sample contains many small and medium-
6Notice that β1 will not be estimated because the firm characteristics of the acquiring firm cancel from
numerator and denominator.
7In the case of a merger, the larger firm in terms of employment is defined as the acquiring firm.
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sized firms, it is not surprising to find the opposite. I interpret this result as a hint
that large firms tend to acquire smaller firms in line with Mueller (1980), who states
that the probability of acquiring another firm increases with firm size. The measure for
geographical proximity shows that firms located close to each other are more likely to
merge. Concrete, a 100km decrease in the distance between firms increases the likelihood
of a merger or acquisition by 10%-points. The differences in credit rating and in firm age
of the merger pairs turn out not to be statistically significant.
Table 2: Conditional Logit Regression of Acquisition Choice
(I) (II)
marg. eff. marg. eff.
(std. err.) (std. err.)
∆ log(employees) .06** .04**
(.02) (.02)
∆ credit rating/100 .01 -.005
(.06) (.05)
∆ firm age -.001 .001
(.001) (.001)
technological proximity .63*** .55*
(.24) (.30)
same industry .45** .36*
(.19) (.20)
geographical proximity/100 -.10*** -.06*
(.03) (.03)
target’s age .02*** .02**
(.01) (.01)
(target’s age)2/100 -.01*** -.01**
(.004) (.006)
target’s credit rating .13* .12**
(.07) (.06)
> 250 employees -.05 -.09
(.08) (.09)
Eastern German target -.74*** -.74***
(.08) (.13)
# obs. 1111 606
LR-χ2 239.33 193.59
Pseudo-R2 .49 .53
*** (**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).
Looking at the variables of special interest, it emerges that output market related merg-
ers are very likely to occur: a discrete change from zero to one in the affiliation to the
same industry increases the probability of a merger or acquisition by 45%, ceteris paribus.
Moreover, technological proximity turns out to be a strong driver of M&As: if the overlap
of firms’ patent portfolios increases by 100% at the mean, which corresponds to a 20%
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overlap, the probability of a merger increases by about 6.3%-points. M&A activities in
the 1990s, therefore, are significantly driven by firms’ concentration on their core compe-
tencies.
With respect to the firm characteristics of the target firm, it turns out that the age
effect on the M&A probability is inversely U-shaped. Very young firms are not very
likely to be targets for a merger or acquisition, but after a certain time when the firm
has built up its organization structure and its reputation, the likelihood of acquiring or
being acquired increases. When the firm reaches a certain age, the probability of a M&A
decreases. The target firm’s credit rating as a proxy for the firm’s financial situation
shows that the probability of being acquired falls, the better the financial situation of
the firm. Moreover, it is evident that Eastern German firms, which still lag behind their
Western German counterparts, are less likely to be acquired. This hints at a ‘picking the
winners’ strategy of the acquiring firms with respect to the target choice. There is no
effect for large target firms measured by the dummy variable that equals one if the firm
has more than 250 employees, on the probability of becoming a target firm.
4 Conclusion
In the context of the fifth merger wave, this paper analyzes whether concentration on core
competencies has driven M&A activities, as is often hypothesized, for a sample of domestic
mergers in Germany. The results provide quite a strong support for this hypothesis: firms
tend to choose M&A partner firms within the same industry and, moreover, prefer merging
partners with a similar technological profile. This leads to the conclusion that M&A deals
in the 1990s are used to concentrate on output market related as well as on technological
competencies in order to secure or maintain competitiveness against the background of
an increasing globalization of markets.
A further finding is that firms with a bad performance are not present in this M&A
sample. Moreover, Eastern German firms, which still lag behind their Western German
counterparts in many respects, are less likely to be involved in M&A activities than their
Western Germany counterparts. Firms located in Eastern Germany are supposed to lack
the financial means to acquire another firm, on the one hand, and to present rather
unattractive targets for a merger, on the other hand.
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Appendix
Table 3: Sample M&As per Year
year number of acquisitions
1993 3
1994 10
1995 10
1996 10
1997 7
1998 26
1999 16
2000 11
2001 8
total 101
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